Slovenske Elektrarne o týchto chybných zásobách vedelo. UJD to tiež vedel. Hovorím to už 2 roky. Mám NAKA sťažnosť. Toto je podvod, ktorého sa dopustili manažéri spoločnosti Slovenske Elektrarne
Slovenske Elektrarne o týchto chybných zásobách vedelo. UJD to tiež vedel. Hovorím to už 2 roky. Mám NAKA sťažnosť. Toto je podvod, ktorého sa dopustili manažéri spoločnosti Slovenske Elektrarne
Mrs. Ziakova,
when you make your beautiful statements from your nice office, comfortable, neat and clean, it is difficult for you to be able to imagine what happens at the same time at EMO34.
Workers throwing coke cans into open pipes, others stealing pieces of copper or other small components. Still others performing checks but simultaneously watching Youtube in their smartphone. Someone (not so few) pee inside the open pipes or behind the cabinets. Others still exchanging badges to get out first .....
All this while the supervisors are in their boxes writing justificatory e-mails, filling incomprehensible excel sheets or continuously exchanging Whatsapp's with the "girlfriends" who are waiting ASAP for them at Nitra.
Yet! Engineers approving documents that do not even understand or, electrical and electronic engineers who do not know Ohm's Law ..Others who do not distinguish a pump from a valve.
If I give you these examples it is because I have lived them several times on my skin.
(from previous comment)
This is the reason why, the only way to save the project by guaranteeing a safe future, goes through much more stringent evaluations than those applicable in a project with a standard story.
Finally, it is important for you not to forget that ENEL (the troll that moves the puppet Slovenske Elektrarne) from the point of view of safety is not reliable.
Why do you keep on defending what is not defensible? If you began to have a more relaxed and objective attitude, you would help much more both the Project and your Country.
I want to meet you!
(from previous comment)
Of the hundreds, probably thousands of deficiencies present, many of which are still unidentified or hidden, only some will be identified by Conformity Checks. What do we do with the others?
Can you be sufficiently sure that none of those deficiencies not identified or kept hidden could weaken the security of EOM34?
Can you be sure enough that a combination of those deficiencies (many still not identified or hidden) can reduce the efficiency of the EMO34 Safety Systems?
I'm sure of the opposite.
Your approach, your speeches, your justifications would all be acceptable subjects if the detailed design and construction of EMO34 had taken place within the minimum ranks of acceptability. Unfortunately, this was not. Detailed design and construction of EMO34 have been realised below any acceptability limit.
(continue in the next comment)
Mrs. Ziakova,
if the Conformity Checks were an absolute and absolutely reliable verification tool, the quality and rigor required for nuclear constructions would not be necessary. It could be built without any rigor because in the end the application of Conformity Checks guarantees that any discrepancy is identified. In this case, building well would only be an economic savings, as the final corrections or failures would be avoided. Unfortunately it is not so, the less it is in Mochovce 3 & 4 where we have seen so many deficiencies of constructions and documents to pass between the legs of UJD without that he had noticed. Conformity checks are a sufficient means of verification, only if the rules have been followed first.
(continue in the next comment)
Mrs. Ziakova,
most of the objections made by me and, above all by my wife, concern the deficiencies present in the portions of the safety systems present in the conventional area which is under ENEL responsibility. Many deficiencies are still unidentifiable and never will be with the current approach. I myself have a substantial list of these deficiencies affecting Nuclear Safety ready to be delivered to your institution.
What about the hundreds of contradictory documents approved by both the project and UJD that exist in the project? Documents with fundamental contradictions. How do you justify this?
Finally, how do you justify that the impact of cronyism and corruption have not created further fundamental deficiencies that we are not yet able to identify? Those phenomena that are widely visible by living in the project.
By the way, I´m writing these notes from my wife apartment in Irkutsk.
I'm just waiting to meet you.
Mrs. Ziakova,
In the Emergency Diesel Generators are still unresolved and unidentified deficiencies. I'll just give you two examples. The only change introduced as a post-Fukushima corrective action was the introduction of a system that monitors the state of the batteries to ensure that these are always ready to allow the system to start. During a review of the project made last year, a serious deficiency has emerged. The valve system that starts the generators should have been duplicated and redundant. It was not! There is a Non-Conformance report on this subject that bears my signature (if it has not been removed from the system). The additional air conditioning system that was supposed to guarantee the operation of the electronics of the generators even in extreme conditions, it is able to guarantee only a temperature higher than the required. Also for this deficiency there is a Non-Conformance Report in my name. Then there are other deficiencies ready to be transmitted.
Mrs. Ziakova,
You mention that the VVER-440/213 is very resistant to catastrophic events because its safety systems are well designed and well sized. And on this we agree. On the other hand, you mention that many safety systems are located in the conventional part. You add that the conventional part was made with a poor quality that is true. Does not it seem to you that there are some direct relationships between these three assertions?
In your statement you mention that it has been simulated that the plant can work for three days without electricity, but you have forgotten or omitted some little magic words. "Without external electricity source". We know very well that Diesel Emergency Generators MUST work immediately and continue to do so until you can connect an alternative energy source. These generators are part of the conventional area and represent one of the poorer constructed systems.
Mrs. Ziakova,
this is a message received today by a qualified and experienced person currently working in the Nuclear Island of Mochovce 3:
"I believe their stupidity and arrogance will push them forward and they will load the fuel as is!"
Mrs. Ziakova,
you continue to climb on technical issues and legal quirks. The real failure of Mochovce 3&4 was the failure of UJD in obliging Slovenske Elektrarne to apply the rules and the working method correctly.
UJD lost its battle against a group of mentally disorganized and filibusting Italians.
By the way, what you say about cables is not so true. It is impossible to rearrange the cables. A colleague from Rosatom said during a visit: "The only solution for cables is to remove them all and redo the job".
I believe that if we want to put EMO34 into operation and we want to do it safely, we must begin to stop defending ourselves and tell the truth.
I want to meet face to face.
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